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Abstract
We use disaggregated data on the components of private xed investment (PFI) to
estimate industry-level responses of real investment and capital prices to unanticipated
monetary policy. The response functions derive from a restricted large-scale VAR
estimated over 1959-2007. Our results point to signicant cross-sector heterogeneity
in the behavior of PFI prices and quantities. For assets belonging to the equipment
category of xed investment, we nd that quantities rather than prices absorb most of
the fallout from a policy shock. By contrast, the price eects tend to be higher and
the output eects lower for nonresidential structures.
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1 Introduction
How quickly and to what extent monetary policy inuences economic conditions varies from
one sector of the economy to another. This makes the task of central banking dicult because
the impetus for policy intervention depends on the source of weakness or instability in the
market. The 2001 recession, for example, was accompanied by declining private expenditures
on capital equipment. The press release following the January 31, 2001 meeting of the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) stated that \business spending on capital equipment [has]
weakened appreciably." The recession of 2007-2009, on the other hand, was greatly intensied
by a collapse in residential investment. Ocial policy statements published after the August
5, 2008 FOMC meeting proclaimed that \the ongoing housing contraction . . . [is] likely to
weigh on economic growth over the next few quarters."
Given the status that investment-related activity has in FOMC deliberations, this paper
empirically examines how conditions across all the private xed investment categories re-
ported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) respond to aggregate monetary shocks.
To date, there are a total of 67 distinct xed investment types represented in the data
that underlie the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). Some examples include
commercial warehouses, lodgings, mining and oileld machinery, railroad equipment, and
single-family housing.1 For each one of these industry groups, the BEA publishes quarterly
data on both nominal expenditures and the price level. Our main goal here is to document
potential cross-sector dierences in the response of these disaggregated series to unantici-
pated monetary policy. We focus on exposing asymmetries not only in the magnitude of the
price and quantity responses, but also in the speed with which policy actions are transmitted
to the many diverse capital-goods producing industries. An analysis of the cross-sectional
results also allows us to see if there are any systematic relationships among prices and quan-
1See Table A in the appendix for a complete list of the separate components of private xed investment.
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tities within more broadly-dened asset categories like residential structures, nonresidential
structures, and durable equipment. Our ndings can therefore provide evidence on whether
market conditions in related industries react similarly to aggregate shocks.
The notion that monetary policy aects various sectors of the economy dierently is
not new. There is a large body of research that studies the impact of policy disturbances
on a wide range of disaggregated prices and quantities, and the results overwhelmingly
point to sizable and signicant cross-sector heterogeneity. Lastrapes (2006) and Balke and
Wynne (2007) demonstrate that policy shocks alter the distribution of prices comprising the
numerous industry components of the Producer Price Index. The authors interpret these
relative price movements as evidence of monetary nonneutrality. Bils, Klenow, and Kryvtsov
(2003) and Altissimo, Mojon, and Zaaroni (2009) draw similar conclusions for the major
retail price categories found in the US and euro area Consumer Price Index, respectively.2
Using industry-level data, Barth and Ramey (2002), Dedola and Lippi (2005), and Loo and
Lastrapes (1998) report substantial heterogeneity in sectoral output responses to a monetary
shock. Carlino and Dena (1998) examine the policy eects on real personal income in the
eight BEA regions of the United States. They nd evidence of asymmetry in the response
patterns and trace this result to dierences in certain industry characteristics across regions.
Despite the many contributions that deal with the sectoral eects of monetary policy, the
literature is largely silent on whether changes in policy inuence the various types of invest-
ment activity dierently.3 The reason is that existing empirical studies emphasize aggregate
investment and disregard information contained in disaggregate data (e.g., Bernanke and
Gertler, 1995; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999). Our paper aims to ll this void,
and by doing so, contributes to the policy discussion in two ways. First, central banks want
2In a related set of papers, Clark (2006), Boivin, Giannoni, and Mihov (2009), and Baumeister, Liu, and
Mumtaz (2013) use disaggregate data to assess dierences between aggregate and sectoral ination dynamics.
Enders and Ma (2011) show that the volatility declines experienced during the so-called Great Moderation
era did not occur simultaneously across all sectors of the US economy.
3Recent theoretical contributions include Erceg and Levin (2006) and Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007).
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to know how their actions aect conditions across the full spectrum of capital-producing
industries. Our results help inform policymakers by exposing dierences in the response to a
monetary shock among all the major investment categories represented in the NIPA. Second,
the stylized facts that emerge from this study can serve as benchmarks for developing and
evaluating more comprehensive models of the monetary transmission mechanism.
To obtain the responses of industry-level prices and quantities, we employ a quarterly
structural vector autoregression (VAR) and identify monetary shocks as orthogonalized in-
novations to the federal funds rate. Our estimation period is 1959 to 2007. As rst shown
by Sims (1992) and Bernanke and Blinder (1992), the VAR is a convenient framework for es-
timating the dynamic eects of monetary policy innovations. To maintain sucient degrees
of freedom, however, estimated VARs typically involve a limited number of macroeconomic
variables. Incorporating a broad panel of disaggregated investment data would obviously
violate this practice and, absent restrictions on the model, make estimation infeasible for
any suitable lag choice. In this paper we avoid problems associated with most large-scale
VARs by adopting an empirical strategy used by Barth and Ramey (2002) and formalized in
Lastrapes (2005). The procedure calls for segmenting the VAR into two blocks, the rst con-
taining macroeconomic aggregates or `common factors' and the second containing industry
variables. Degrees of freedom are preserved by assuming (i) common factors are independent
of the industry block and (ii) variables in the latter subset are mutually independent after
conditioning on the former. Under these conditions least squares is ecient and monetary
policy innovations can be identied through restrictions on just the macro-variable equations.
Estimation results show that policy outcomes are not uniform across capital-producing
industries. While most, but not all, prices and quantities increase after a policy expansion,
there is signicant cross-sectional variation in the size and speed of the adjustment paths.
The implication is that monetary policy has distributional eects, not only on the com-
position of xed investment but also on the dispersion of relative prices. A more focused
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comparison among certain industry groups, however, reveals similarities in the way some
prices and quantities interact over time. For example, where prices of durable equipment of-
ten react slowly to a policy shock, production volumes tend to respond swiftly. By contrast,
producers of nonresidential structures usually raise prices in the short run rather than adjust
quantities. In markets for residential structures, the expansionary eects of policy show up
almost immediately in both prices and quantities.
2 Investment Data
Source data on nominal expenditures and price indexes for all categories of private xed
investment (PFI) come from the Underlying Detail Tables for Gross Domestic Product re-
ported (online) by the BEA.4 The tables disassemble PFI into various components, the num-
ber of which dier by level of aggregation. There are only two components reported at the
highest aggregation level, residential and nonresidential investment. The former comprises
residential investment in structures and equipment while the latter consists of nonresiden-
tial structures, equipment, and a third group encompassing items described as intellectual
property products.5 The underlying data decompose PFI further into 16 separate subcate-
gories covering more narrowly-dened sectors of the economy. This third level of aggregation
includes series such as commercial and health care buildings, transportation equipment, soft-
ware, and permanent-site residential structures. Sinking even further in the detailed NIPA
estimates reveals as many as 67 individual series spanning all of PFI. They represent the
most disaggregate measures available in the underlying data, and most of them summarize
investment activity within a specic industry. Some examples include food and beverage
establishments, religious structures, photocopy equipment, farm tractors, and dormitories.
4http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index UD.cfm/
5Intellectual property products were grouped and re-classied as a component of nonresidential xed
investment as part of the comprehensive revision to the NIPA in July of 2013.
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Table A in the appendix lists all of the component series of PFI and organizes them accord-
ing to aggregation level. The table also reports nominal spending on each disaggregate as a
percentage share of total private xed investment in 2007.
The estimation exercises carried out in this paper employ a panel of investment data
assembled at the most detailed aggregation level published by the BEA. The panel consists
of disaggregate price and quantity series for the numerous components listed in Table A.
In the majority of cases, data on these measures are available on a quarterly basis from
1959 through the present. A small number of these series, however, were excluded from
the analysis because of missing observations. In such instances, the oending series were
replaced by data from the next lowest level of aggregation.6 This left us with a total of 64
disaggregate series on PFI prices and an equal number of series on nominal investment. The
set of variables omitted from our panel represented just 3:4% of PFI expenditures in 2007.7
3 Empirical Framework
We are interested in characterizing the eects of exogenous monetary shocks on the cross-
sectional variation among investment prices and real investment spending. Following in the
tradition of Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano et al. (1999), we employ a vector
autoregression and identify monetary shocks as innovations to the federal funds rate.
One complication that emerges from our use of disaggregate data concerns the large
dimensionality of a VAR that includes, among other variables, 128 dierent PFI prices and
quantities. Without placing additional restrictions on the model, insucient observations
and a loss of degrees of freedom make estimation infeasible. To address this problem, we
6Separate data on light trucks, including utility vehicles, and other trucks, buses, and truck trailers (lines
56 and 57 of Table A) are not available before 1987. We therefore replace these series with aggregate data
on trucks, buses, and truck trailers (line 55), which appear without interruption from 1959 on.
7The BEA does not compute price indexes for net purchases of used residential or nonresidential structures
(lines 34 and 93 of Table A). Both quantities are therefore excluded from the panel.
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borrow from Barth and Ramey (2002) and Lastrapes (2005) by partitioning the variables
into two blocks. The rst block consists of macroeconomic variables or `common factors' that
appear regularly in the monetary VAR literature. It includes real gross domestic product
(GDP), the GDP chain-type price index (P), total private xed investment (PFI), the deator
for private xed investment (Q), the ratio of crude materials to nished goods in the Producer
Price Index (PCM), the eective federal funds rate (FFR), and the ratio of nonborrowed to
total reserves (NTR).8 The second block consists of only two equations at a time, one for the
disaggregate price series of interest and the other for its corresponding real quantity. Ecient
estimation and consistent identication of the FFR shock can be obtained by imposing
exclusion restrictions on the set of coecients in the macro-variable equations that govern
feedback from the disaggregate series. This ensures that common factors are independent of
the industry variables since the feedback coecients of the former are xed across regressions.
Coecients of the disaggregate series are permitted to vary with each industry examined.9
The relationship between aggregate and industry variables can be seen more clearly by
considering the VAR process
Zt = + A(L)Zt 1 + t; (1)
where Z 0t = [GDPt Pt PFIt Qt PCMt FFRt NTRt ij;t qj;t],  is a vector of constants, A(L)
is a conformable lag polynomial of nite order, and the error term t  i.i.d. (0;
). The
quantities ij;t and qj;t denote real spending and the price deator, respectively, on investment
goods from industry j. Independence of the rst seven variables from ij;t and qj;t is obtained
8We include the relative price of crude materials in order to mitigate the \price puzzle," a temporary
deation following a negative funds rate shock. Sims (1992) points out that such inconsistencies are the
result of omitting variables from the VAR that provide information on expected future ination.
9Using similar restrictions to estimate sectoral responses to oil shocks, Davis and Haltiwanger (2001)
argue that the resultant system is equivalent to a pseudo-panel-data VAR.
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by imposing restrictions on the lag polynomial of the form
A
99
(k) =
2664 A1;177(k) 072
A2;1
27
(k) A2;2
22
(k)
3775
for all k lags. These restrictions imply that macroeconomic aggregates are unaected by
variations in the disaggregate series. It follows that estimation and identication of monetary
shocks will be the same regardless of which price-quantity industry pair is used in the VAR.
By including only one (ij;t, qj;t) combination at a time, we are also assuming that the full
set of investment prices and quantities are mutually independent after conditioning on the
rst seven common factors. Thus any observed correlation across industries is accounted for
by their joint dependence on the aggregate macro variables. Had we expanded Zt to consider
all industries simultaneously, the assumption of mutual independence would impose a block-
diagonal structure on the matrix A2;2(k) (a 128128 object in this case) for all k lags. That
is to say, each pair of (ij;t, qj;t) equations would contain only its own lagged values as well as
lags of the common factors. This is equivalent to estimating our 9-variable system separately
for each industry category while leaving the 22 partitions A2;2(k) completely unrestricted.
To identify monetary shocks, we adopt the recursiveness approach described in Chris-
tiano et al. (1999). The procedure begins by specifying a relationship between structural
disturbances (t) and reduced-form errors (t) of the form t = St, where S is a 9  9
contemporaneous matrix. It follows that (1) can be written in terms of structural shocks as
Zt = B(L) (+ St) ; (2)
where B(L)  (I   A(L)L) 1 is a convergent innite-order lag polynomial. Here monetary
shocks are interpreted as structural innovations to the federal funds rate, corresponding to
the sixth element of t in the transformed system (2). The impulse responses of Zt to a
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policy shock are summarized by the matrix polynomial B(L)S.
The elements of B(L) and S are estimated in two steps. First, we use ordinary least
squares on (1) to obtain estimates of A(L) and t. We then impose orthogonality and normal-
ization (unit variance) restrictions on the covariance matrix of t along with triangular restric-
tions on the matrix S. This allows us to identify S from a standard Choleski decomposition
of 
. Given estimates of A(L), estimates of B(L) are derived from B(L) = (I   A(L)L) 1.
Imposing a lower triangular structure on S is motivated by assumptions regarding time
lags in the transmission of monetary shocks to the broader economy. One assumption is
that the common factors appearing above FFRt in (1) react to a policy innovation with a
one-quarter delay. These restrictions are met by inserting zeros in the rst ve elements of
the sixth column of S. A second assumption is that variables below the funds rate may react
contemporaneously (within the same quarter) to an FFR shock. The last four coecients in
the sixth column of S are therefore kept free. Note that by ordering ij;t and qj;t last, we are
assuming monetary shocks can aect industry variables before they aect the macro variables
(excluding NTR).10 No additional timing restrictions are needed to achieve identication.11
The dataset consists of quarterly observations covering 1959:Q1 to 2007:Q4.12 All series
except FFRt are expressed in natural-log levels. Real investment spending for industry j
is the ratio of nominal expenditures to the industry price index described in the previous
section. Finally, four lags of each variable are used in estimating (1). We found this number
was sucient to stamp out the serial correlation in both macro and industry-level residuals.13
10An alternative view is that policy shocks should aect both macro and industry-level variables no sooner
than with a one-quarter lag. In this case ij;t and qj;t must be positioned above FFRt in (1). It turns out that
such a re-ordering has little eect on our main quantitative results since the large majority of impact-period
responses of the industry variables are not signicantly dierent from zero (see Fig. 3).
11As shown by Christiano et al. (1999), the set of response functions are invariant to the specic ordering
of variables within the two groups above and below the funds rate.
12We exclude dates covering the nancial crisis and recovery. During this period, nonborrowed reserves be-
came negative due to injections of borrowed reserves through the Term Auction Facility. This is problematic
for estimation since the relevant variable is the natural log of the ratio of nonborrowed to total reserves.
13Ljung-Box Q tests fail to reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation in the residuals at the 5% level.
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4 Empirical Findings
4.1 Aggregate Responses to a Policy Shock
Before commenting on the industry response functions, we verify that our estimated VAR
generates aggregate dynamics consistent with known ndings. Fig. 1 plots impulse responses
for GDPt, Pt, PCMt, FFRt, and NTRt to a one standard deviation (71 basis point) drop in
the federal funds rate. Shaded regions correspond to 90 percent condence bands.14
The aggregate eects of an expansionary FFR innovation can be summarized as follows.
First, there is a persistent decline in the funds rate accompanied by a large and persistent
increase in the ratio of nonborrowed to total reserves. Estimates suggest that it takes over
a year for both quantities to return to pre-shock levels. Second, real GDP exhibits the
usual hump-shaped pattern seen in numerous empirical studies (e.g., Leeper, Sims, and Zha,
1996). Here we nd that it reaches a peak of 0:65 percent roughly six quarters after the shock.
Third, after a delay of ve quarters, the chain-type price index for GDP starts climbing to
a permanently higher level. Four years after the shock, however, it is still only 0:64 percent
above the baseline. Results showing that aggregate prices respond sluggishly to a policy
shock appear frequently in the VAR literature (e.g., Christiano et al., 1999). Fourth, a funds
rate shock generates a large and sustained increase in the relative price of crude materials.
The maximum impact is nearly 2 percent and occurs at a horizon of three years.
14Condence bands are computed using Monte Carlo methods. We rst take the joint distribution of the
VAR coecients and the residual covariance matrix to be asymptotically normal with mean equaling the
sample estimates and covariance equaling the sample covariance matrix of those estimates. We then draw
10; 000 random vectors from this normal distribution and, preserving the identication restrictions, compute
impulse response functions for each draw. Ninety percent condence bands correspond to the 5th and 95th
percent bounds of the simulated distribution of impulse response functions over all 10; 000 trials.
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Fig. 1. Estimated impulse responses to a one standard deviation (71 basis point) drop in the federal funds rate are graphed
for the following aggregate macroeconomic variables: GDP - real GDP, P - GDP chain-type price index, PCM - ratio of crude
materials to nished goods in the Producer Price Index, FFR - eective federal funds rate, NTR - ratio of nonborrowed to
total reserves. The shaded regions correspond to 90 percent condence bands.
4.2 Disaggregate Responses to a Policy Shock
In this section we analyze the responses of our disaggregate investment series to an expan-
sionary monetary policy shock, that is, an unanticipated reduction (of 71 basis points) to the
federal funds rate. The discussion focuses on movements in both prices and real investment
quantities. Together, they tell us how market conditions in each of the industries comprising
PFI react to a policy innovation. Knowledge of both output and relative price dynamics also
helps policymakers obtain a more detailed account of the monetary transmission mechanism.
Fig. 2 plots the responses of output and the price level in each sector to a negative funds
rate innovation. The solid lines are the response functions for total private xed investment,
PFIt, and its corresponding price index, Qt. Both variables belong to the macro-equation
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Fig. 2. Estimated impulse responses to a one standard deviation (71 basis point) drop in the federal funds rate are graphed for
sectoral PFI quantities (left panel) and PFI prices (right panel). Thick dashed lines are unweighted average responses across all
sectors. Thick solid lines are the responses of the aggregate PFI quantity and price index. The shaded regions are 90 percent
condence bands for the aggregate response functions.
block of (1) and are assumed to be unaected by policy in the initial period. The dashed
lines represent the unweighted average of all sectoral price and quantity responses. Their
proximity to PFIt and Qt suggests that the specic breakdown of xed investment into its
disaggregate components (e.g., the percentage shares reported in Table A) does not have a
major impact on the behavior of aggregate prices and quantities following a monetary shock.
Our estimates point to considerable variation in the way industries respond to a policy
expansion. Dierences emerge not only in the magnitude of the adjustment paths, but also
in the direction. Regarding investment quantities, we nd that a substantial portion (31
percent) respond negatively four quarters after the shock. In the majority of cases, however,
the real eects are positive, and as a result, the unweighted mean response across all 64
industries at the one-year mark is 0:90 percent. Results also show most of the disaggregate
quantities taking on the familiar hump-shaped prole seen in the aggregate data. Despite
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Table 1
Summary statistics for the distribution of PFI price and quantity responses
Quantity responses (in percent) Price responses (in percent)
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
Private xed investment (64)
average 0.90 1.59 1.40 1.02  0:07 0.28 0.67 0.97
median 0.88 1.55 1.44 0.92  0:03 0.19 0.65 1.01
minimum  3:86  7:03  4:31  2:38  1:96  2:43  2:49  2:30
maximum 5.15 5.46 5.49 6.05 0.53 2.10 3.50 4.20
standard deviation 1.76 2.00 1.71 1.60 0.36 0.61 0.76 0.77
Nonresidential structures (23)
average  0:02 0.76 0.86 0.62 0.12 0.62 1.18 1.45
median 0.03 0.80 1.05 0.49 0.15 0.62 1.03 1.36
minimum  3:11  2:45  2:76  2:22  0:33 0.08 0.61 0.85
maximum 1.61 3.18 3.40 5.00 0.51 2.10 3.50 4.20
standard deviation 1.29 1.47 1.41 1.47 0.17 0.36 0.54 0.61
Residential structures (6)
average 2.11 0.95  0:22  0:75 0.33 0.85 1.18 1.37
median 3.32 2.05 0.24  0:83 0.40 0.93 1.24 1.45
minimum  3:86  7:03  4:31  2:38  0:03 0.41 0.71 0.90
maximum 5.15 4.05 2.39 1.25 0.53 1.12 1.46 1.66
standard deviation 2.94 3.67 2.10 1.26 0.21 0.26 0.28 0.29
Equipment (32)
average 1.40 2.44 2.22 1.71  0:27  0:05 0.29 0.60
median 1.28 2.31 1.93 1.23  0:20  0:04 0.31 0.61
minimum  1:32  1:09  0:63  0:60  1:96  2:43  2:49  2:30
maximum 4.74 5.46 5.49 6.05 0.17 2.03 2.86 2.37
standard deviation 1.46 1.56 1.44 1.43 0.37 0.61 0.75 0.72
Intellectual property (3)
average 0.14 0.15 0.06 0.14  0:16  0:03 0.20 0.42
median  0:01 0.13 0.05 0.17  0:14  0:01 0.26 0.51
minimum  0:54  0:23  0:18  0:13  0:24  0:17  0:09 0.05
maximum 0.98 0.54 0.31 0.38  0:09 0.08 0.43 0.69
standard deviation 0.63 0.32 0.20 0.21 0.06 0.10 0.22 0.27
Notes: The table reports summary statistics describing the cross-sectional distribution of PFI price and quantity responses at
selected horizons to a one standard deviation (71 basis point) drop in the federal funds rate. Sample moments are computed
across the full set of industries comprising private xed investment (64 series) along with subgroups comprising nonresidential
structures (23 series), residential structures (6 series), equipment (32 series), and intellectual property products (3 series).
these similarities, we observe signicant heterogeneity in the amplitude of sectoral responses.
About half peak between 0 and 2 percent while another third reach highs of 3 to 6 percent.
There appears to be less cross-sectional heterogeneity in the responses of investment
prices. For the rst few quarters after a shock, most PFI prices are not far from their
baseline values. Estimates reveal that it takes one year for the average price level to start
rising on a consistent basis. Over a period of four years, however, all but two of the industries
experience some ination. A majority (two-thirds) sustain anywhere from 0:5 to 1:5 percent.
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the distribution of industry responses one, two,
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three, and four years after the occurrence of a policy shock. Across all categories of private
xed investment we see that the dispersion in quantities, as measured by standard deviation,
is greater than the dispersion in prices at each horizon. The spread of output responses
reaches its highest point about eight quarters after the shock, with half of all industries
having increased anywhere from 1:55 to 5:46 percent. By comparison, price dispersion is
smaller and increases gradually for the rst few years. The standard deviation is only 0:36
percent one year after the shock but rises to 0:77 percent by the end of year four. It is also
interesting to note that while the distribution of responses continually shifts towards higher
average prices, the variance of that distribution levels o three years after the shock.
Whether price and quantity dispersion is a compelling feature of the data depends to some
extent on the signicance of the estimates displayed in Fig. 2. To assess signicance, we
follow Balke and Wynne (2007) by recording the fraction of disaggregate responses that are
statistically dierent from zero at the 10 percent level. A response is considered signicant
if at least 90 percent of the simulated responses, obtained by sampling from the normal
distribution described in footnote 14, are either strictly positive or strictly negative. The
results are illustrated in Fig. 3. At horizons of two quarters or less, the fraction of statistically
signicant output responses never exceeds 25 percent. The proportion increases to around
60 percent seven quarters after the shock and reverts back to 20 percent by the four-year
mark. Regarding PFI prices, barely 14 percent are signicant one quarter after the policy
shock, but over 50 percent are signicant six quarters later. By the end of the fourth year,
as many as 80 percent of industry prices are statistically dierent from pre-shock levels.
That a large share of disaggregate responses are signicant bolsters the argument made
by some that monetary nonneutralities are present in the capital-goods sector of the US
economy. Should one's goal be to identify the underlying sources of nonneutrality, the
results of our VAR analysis could in principle be used to evaluate the likelihood of alternative
models (e.g., price rigidity, imperfect information, limited participation). Here our objective
13
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Fig. 3. The fraction of all PFI prices (dotted line) and quantities (solid line) in which the response to a monetary policy shock
is signicantly dierent from zero at a 90 percent condence level are graphed for horizons of up to four years. The shock is an
unexpected decrease of 71 basis points to the federal funds rate.
is simply to characterize the behavior of investment in response to unanticipated monetary
policy, and as such, the reaction of PFI quantities make two things clear: monetary shocks
have nontrivial eects on real investment spending in the short run, and the intensity of these
eects vary greatly across industries. Thus policy appears to have important distributional
eects which, according to economic theory, can only occur if accompanied by movements
in relative investment prices. Our ndings are consistent with the notion that monetary
nonneutralities are linked to relative price changes since both the mean and variance of the
cross-sectional distribution of PFI prices increase in the aftermath of a policy shock.
Estimates from our structural VAR show that prices and quantities generally increase
in the years following an unexpected drop in the funds rate. Yet the same estimates also
point to considerable variation across industries in the timing and magnitude of these eects.
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IRF(ij,t ) = α + β × IRF(qj,t ) + ej,t
Fig. 4. All 64 pairs of sectoral PFI price and quantity responses to an identied monetary policy shock are depicted in a
scatter plot at one, two, and three year horizons. The shock is an unexpected decrease of 71 basis points to the federal funds
rate. The solid line represents the cross-sectional regression line.
In some industries output adjusts rapidly, while in others it is the price level that is most
aected by policy. A natural question then is whether there might be any pattern or tendency
in the way investment prices and quantities interact over time. To answer this question, we
follow Boivin et al. (2009) and Baumeister et al. (2013) by forming scatter plots of the price
and quantity responses for all 64 PFI categories one, two, and three years after a policy
innovation. The results, along with cross-sectional regression lines, are shown in Fig. 4.
Plots of the various price-quantity combinations suggest that there may be some com-
monality in the way dierent industries respond to a monetary shock. In particular, we nd
that industries experiencing the biggest gains in real output tend to be the ones experienc-
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ing the smallest growth in prices. Conversely, price increases are usually higher in sectors
where output growth is lower. Our results also show this relationship to be persistent, which
explains why the cross-sectional regression lines are negatively sloped at each response hori-
zon. Point estimates of these slope coecients, however, should be interpreted with a great
deal of caution. Although they range from  0:45 after one year to  0:17 after three years,
none are statistically signicant at regular condence levels. Thus evidence of a consistent
inverse relationship between the magnitudes of our price and quantity responses is somewhat
limited when looking across all industry components of private xed investment. In the next
section, we examine whether the evidence is any more convincing for sample groups that
include only those industries belonging to more narrowly-dened subcategories of PFI.
4.3 Major Components of Fixed Investment
To determine whether conditions across certain industry groups react similarly to a policy
innovation, we organize the sectoral price and quantity responses into four major investment
subcategories: nonresidential structures, residential structures, durable equipment, and in-
tellectual property products. Of the 64 PFI components included in our sample, the BEA
classies 23 as nonresidential structures, 6 as residential structures, 32 as equipment, and 3
as intellectual property. Fig. 5 sorts our estimated response functions into these four groups,
and Fig. 6 plots the fraction within each group that are signicant at the 10 percent level.
Looking only at nonresidential structures, we see substantial heterogeneity in the response
of disaggregate quantities. The statistics reported in Table 1 conrm that four quarters after
the shock, roughly half of the responses are still negative, with some falling as much as 3
percent below baseline values. Though most do tend to rise over time, it is clear that the
cross-sectional dispersion in quantities persists well beyond the one-year mark. As a result,
the unweighted mean response across all 23 industries is basically zero for the rst year
and tops out at just 0:86 percent by the end of year three. The behavior of prices is very
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Fig. 5. Estimated impulse responses to a one standard deviation (71 basis point) drop in the federal funds rate for all PFI
quantities (left panel) and prices (right panel) are sorted by nonresidential structures, residential structures, durable equipment,
and intellectual property products. Thick dashed lines are unweighted average responses across all industries within a given
category. Thick solid lines are the responses of the aggregate quantity and price index (aggregation level 2 in Table A).
dierent. Excluding one industry (petroleum and natural gas wells), the distribution of prices
for nonresidential structures is more compact than the distribution for all components of PFI.
Moreover, these prices typically adjust faster and with greater intensity. The median response
eight quarters after the shock is 0:62 percent, compared to 0:19 percent when accounting for
all of PFI. Taken together, our estimates reveal that in markets for nonresidential structures,
prices are on average more responsive to monetary shocks than output.
Disparities between the adjustment of industry prices and quantities is perhaps even more
visible among producers of durable equipment. For this class of investment goods, however,
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Fig. 6. For each of the four major components of PFI{nonresidential structures, residential structures, durable equipment,
and intellectual property products{the fraction of prices (dotted lines) and quantities (solid lines) in which the response to a
monetary policy shock is signicantly dierent from zero at a 90 percent condence level are graphed for horizons of up to four
years. The shock is an unexpected decrease of 71 basis points to the federal funds rate.
it is output rather than prices that tend to be more elastic. Estimates show that most of the
32 disaggregate quantities peak around eight quarters after the shock. Also worth noting
here are the large dierences in the amplitude of responses across industries. In half of them
production is anywhere from 2:31 to 5:46 percent higher than pre-shock levels. By contrast,
disaggregate prices are generally slow to adjust. Our ndings indicate that two years elapse
before average equipment prices respond positively to an unexpected drop in the funds rate.
Despite having only a limited eect on the mean, monetary shocks still generate signicant
cross-sectional variation in prices. Leaving out computers and peripheral equipment, sectoral
price growth four years after a policy shock ranges from  0:18 to 2:37 percent.
In markets for nonresidential structures and equipment, there is a tendency for either
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prices or quantities to absorb most of the eects of a policy expansion. The same rela-
tionship clearly does not describe the market for residential structures. In the quarters
immediately following an unanticipated drop in the funds rate, both prices and production
of residential structures move higher. Regarding the latter, estimates reveal that sectoral
output (excluding construction of dormitories) usually peaks four to ve quarters after the
shock, and according to Table 1, the median response at this horizon is 3:32 percent. The
real eects also appear to be relatively short-lived. It takes on average about three years for
most disaggregate quantities to revert to pre-shock levels. With regard to prices, evidence
suggests that all but one respond quickly to a monetary shock. The median response exceeds
0:40 percent just one year after the shock and nears one percent by the end of year two.15
With only three sectors comprising intellectual property products, we are unable to iden-
tify any pattern in the way market conditions respond to a policy innovation. For example,
real production of entertainment, literary, and artistic originals grows by almost one percent
for the rst year. Production of software and research and development, on the other hand,
both decline in the months following a funds rate shock, with the former shrinking as much
as 0:54 percent. Meanwhile, the price levels observed in these sectors display signicant
inertia. Response functions indicate that two years go by before average prices start rising.
4.4 Evidence on Capital Supply Elasticities
That the prices of certain capital goods are more/less responsive to monetary shocks than
investment quantities bears some resemblance to results reported in Goolsbee (1998), Has-
sett and Hubbard (1998), and Edgerton (2010). In all three papers, the authors use data
on producers' durable equipment to determine whether tax credits aimed at stimulating
investment demand increase real production or simply materialize in the form of higher
15That prices and quantities of residential structures are sensitive to a policy innovation echoes results
obtained by Baumeister et al. (2013) for the durables component of personal consumption expenditures.
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capital-goods prices. Goolsbee (1998) argues that the real eects are severely limited by the
fact that short-run equipment supply curves are inelastic. His argument is based on a series
of regressions showing that for most asset types, a 10 percent investment tax credit raises
prices by more than 8 percent. By contrast, Hassett and Hubbard (1998) and Edgerton
(2010) present regression coecients that point to much higher capital supply elasticities.
They conclude that policy incentives designed to boost investment demand will likely have
signicant eects on xed-capital formation with only modest eects on prices.16
Since we are examining how the price and quantity of xed investment reacts to mone-
tary rather than scal stimuli, our estimates can neither conrm nor discredit the ndings
described above. Given the demand-side nature of the two policies, however, it may be use-
ful to draw some comparisons between the elasticities reported in this literature and those
implied by our VAR model. To that end, Table 2 presents short-run output elasticities to
a one standard deviation drop in the federal funds rate for each industry represented in
the durable equipment category of PFI. We dene the short-run elasticity as the maximum
point estimate of the impulse response function recorded between six months and two years
after the policy innovation.17 The table also lists the quarter in which the peak eect occurs
along with an estimate of the concurrent price elasticity. Information on the responsiveness
of both prices and output helps clarify the extent to which upward-sloping capital supply
schedules undermine the real eects of expansionary monetary policy.
Results from our VAR show that 25 of 32 industries exhibit positive and signicant output
elasticities in the short run. The biggest increases take place in sectors that produce heavy
machinery (e.g., farm and construction tractors, other agricultural and construction machin-
ery, mining and oileld machinery, and service industry machinery) or large transportation
16In a simultaneous equations setting, Edgerton (2010) directly estimates the price elasticity of supply for
construction, agricultural, and mining and oileld machinery. His estimates indicate that only 17 percent of
the value of tax subsidies would pass through into machinery prices.
17Transforming the industry variables into natural-log levels means that impulse response estimates can
be interpreted as elasticities.
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Table 2
Output and price elasticities for durable equipment
Output Price
Industry elasticity Period elasticity
Computers and peripheral equipment 2:814 [0:51; 5:37] 8  2:431 [ 3:73; 1:35]
Communication equipment 1:809 [0:60; 3:14] 8  0:450 [ 0:88; 0:06]
Electro-medical equipment 2:788 [1:01; 4:79] 6  0:492 [ 1:02; 0:11]
Medical instruments 0:391 [ 0:31; 1:07] 3  0:128 [ 0:29; 0:03]
Nonmedical instruments 1:460 [0:54; 2:38] 8  0:209 [ 0:42; 0:01]
Photocopy & related equipment 0:882 [ 1:83; 3:69] 6  0:493 [ 1:09; 0:04]
Oce & accounting equipment 4:639 [2:25; 7:32] 8  0:263 [ 0:53; 0:01]
Fabricated metal products 0:844 [ 0:30; 2:00] 8 0:398 [ 0:03; 0:86]
Steam engines  0:153 [ 3:30; 3:03] 2  0:122 [ 0:47; 0:23]
Internal combustion engines 3:303 [2:12; 4:62] 8  0:034 [ 0:43; 0:34]
Metalworking machinery 1:654 [ 0:11; 3:29] 8 0:064 [ 0:30; 0:43]
Special industry machinery, n.e.c. 0:824 [ 0:25; 1:92] 7  0:010 [ 0:39; 0:36]
General industrial & materials handling 2:179 [1:17; 3:21] 8  0:046 [ 0:34; 0:25]
Electrical transmission & distribution apparatus 1:553 [0:71; 2:41] 8  0:254 [ 0:61; 0:07]
Trucks, buses, & truck trailers 4:212 [2:50; 6:03] 6  0:071 [ 0:35; 0:20]
Autos 1:807 [0:70; 2:99] 5  0:038 [ 0:44; 0:35]
Aircraft 1:895 [ 0:98; 4:99] 8 0:258 [ 0:03; 0:56]
Ships & boats 4:511 [1:85; 7:38] 8 0:198 [ 0:06; 0:44]
Railroad equipment 3:443 [0:42; 6:75] 8 0:625 [0:06; 1:19]
Household furniture 1:657 [0:07; 3:28] 6  0:059 [ 0:26; 0:14]
Other furniture 1:600 [0:65; 2:60] 6  0:055 [ 0:35; 0:21]
Farm tractors 4:614 [2:66; 6:62] 5  0:397 [ 0:68; 0:12]
Other agricultural machinery 2:604 [1:08; 4:19] 8  0:045 [ 0:37; 0:26]
Construction tractors 5:932 [2:76; 9:20] 6  0:040 [ 0:43; 0:33]
Other construction machinery 4:383 [2:41; 6:43] 7 0:079 [ 0:29; 0:44]
Mining & oileld machinery 3:842 [0:02; 7:97] 8 0:175 [ 0:40; 0:74]
Service industry machinery 1:560 [0:72; 2:46] 7  0:188 [ 0:42; 0:01]
Household appliances 3:432 [1:97; 4:99] 6  0:302 [ 0:59; 0:03]
Miscellaneous electrical 3:562 [1:94; 5:37] 8  0:024 [ 0:31; 0:25]
Other 2:447 [1:58; 3:42] 8  0:362 [ 0:69; 0:07]
Less: Sale of equipment scrap, excluding autos 5:461 [3:09; 8:06] 8 2:034 [0:00; 4:07]
Residential equipment 1:772 [0:99; 2:64] 6  0:306 [ 0:50; 0:12]
Notes: The table reports output and price elasticities to a 71 basis point drop in the federal funds rate for each industry in the
durable equipment category of PFI (ordered as they appear in Table A). Output elasticity is the maximum point estimate of
the sectoral response function recorded between six months and two years after the funds rate shock. Period is the number of
quarters after the shock in which the peak eect occurs. Price elasticity is the estimate of the sectoral price response function
that prevails during the quarter identied in the preceding column. Bracketed numbers are 90 percent condence intervals.
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equipment (e.g., trucks, buses, and truck trailers, autos, ships and boats, and railroad equip-
ment). A negative funds rate innovation boosts real production in these industries anywhere
from 1:5 to 6 percent within two years. Yet over the same period, just 8 of 32 industries sus-
tain higher prices, and in only two cases is the increase statistically above zero at a 90 percent
condence level. According to our estimates, a larger share actually experience a signicant
decline in prices. For example, sectors that produce information processing equipment (e.g.,
computers, communication, and electro-medical equipment, nonmedical instruments, and
oce and accounting equipment) see prices falling between 0:2 and 2:5 percent.18
The evidence in Table 2 tells a consistent story about markets for durable equipment.
Monetary expansions, which increase the demand for xed investment, lead to signicant
growth in real quantities with few discernible price increases.19 These ndings are clearly at
odds with the notion put forth by Goolsbee (1998) that equipment supply curves are inelastic
in the short run. Instead, they favor the opposite interpretation of the data suggested by
Hassett and Hubbard (1998) and Edgerton (2010) that capital supply elasticities are quite
large. Under such conditions, the eects of a stimulative demand shock would show up in
quantities rather than prices.
While not part of Goolsbee's original analysis, disaggregated data on nonresidential struc-
tures is actually more consistent with the view that capital supply curves are relatively
inelastic in the short run. Table 3 presents output and price elasticities for each indus-
try comprising the nonresidential structures component of PFI. In sharp contrast to the
equipment category, our estimates show a positive and signicant price elasticity in 15 of
23 industries. We observe some of the biggest price increases, ranging from 0:6 to 2:1 per-
cent, among producers of petroleum and natural gas wells as well as commercial and health
18These negative price elasticities may be partly attributable to diculties in correcting the investment
deators for unmeasured quality improvements. See Goolsbee (1998) for a discussion.
19In the traditional cost of capital model of Hall and Jorgenson (1967), demand for capital services grows
until the rental price equals the user cost of capital, which is increasing in the interest rate. By reducing
interest rates, a monetary expansion should lower user costs and thereby raise the demand for capital services.
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Table 3
Output and price elasticities for nonresidential structures
Output Price
Industry elasticity Period elasticity
Oce 0:291 [ 1:58; 2:06] 8 0:658 [0:34; 1:00]
Hospitals 0:232 [ 0:74; 1:22] 2 0:016 [ 0:09; 0:11]
Special care  0:258 [ 1:38; 0:86] 2 0:069 [ 0:04; 0:18]
Medical buildings 0:517 [ 1:54; 2:54] 8 0:662 [0:34; 1:00]
Multimerchandise shopping 3:184 [1:28; 5:36] 8 0:678 [0:34; 1:04]
Food & beverage establishments 2:269 [0:55; 4:13] 8 0:646 [0:34; 0:96]
Warehouses 2:236 [0:41; 4:19] 8 0:572 [0:29; 0:88]
Other commercial 2:626 [0:99; 4:41] 8 0:629 [0:33; 0:94]
Manufacturing 0:429 [ 1:80; 2:55] 8 0:582 [0:31; 0:87]
Electric  0:289 [ 2:03; 1:45] 3  0:085 [ 0:31; 0:14]
Other power  1:278 [ 2:60; 0:04] 2 0:053 [ 0:19; 0:29]
Communication 1:417 [0:02; 2:89] 8 0:667 [0:25; 1:08]
Petroleum & natural gas 1:095 [ 0:78; 3:04] 8 2:097 [0:62; 3:71]
Mining 2:596 [0:48; 4:84] 7 0:484 [0:21; 0:78]
Religious 1:398 [0:14; 2:69] 8 0:630 [0:33; 0:97]
Educational & vocational 0:995 [ 065; 2:65] 4 0:121 [ 0:07; 0:32]
Lodging  0:528 [ 4:67; 3:21] 8 0:581 [0:20; 1:00]
Amusement & recreation 0:489 [ 1:25; 2:20] 8 0:551 [0:22; 0:89]
Air 0:277 [ 1:61; 2:14] 7 0:427 [0:16; 0:71]
Land 1:493 [ 0:03; 3:07] 6 0:105 [ 0:38; 0:59]
Farm 2:520 [0:16; 4:97] 8 0:767 [0:40; 1:19]
Other  0:382 [ 2:91; 2:12] 8 0:078 [ 0:44; 0:56]
Brokers' commissions on sale of structures 1:484 [ 0:18; 3:19] 8 0:300 [ 0:01; 0:63]
Notes: The table reports output and price elasticities to a 71 basis point drop in the federal funds rate for each industry in the
nonresidential structures category of PFI (ordered as they appear in Table A). Output elasticity is the maximum point estimate
of the sectoral response function recorded between six months and two years after the funds rate shock. Period is the number of
quarters after the shock in which the peak eect occurs. Price elasticity is the estimate of the sectoral price response function
that prevails during the quarter identied in the preceding column. Bracketed numbers are 90 percent condence intervals.
care structures (e.g., oces, medical buildings, multimerchandise shopping, restaurants, and
warehouses). In the eight industries where price elasticities are either negative or insignif-
icant, growth in real production is not statistically dierent from zero. Meanwhile, in only
8 of 23 industries is there compelling evidence of a short-run output eect, a much smaller
portion than what is found across the equipment-goods sector of the economy.
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5 Concluding Remarks
We employ disaggregate data spanning all industry categories of private xed investment to
examine how capital-goods prices and real investment quantities respond to an aggregate
monetary shock. Examining the full spectrum of industries together reveals that while most,
but not all, experience growth in real output, there is considerable heterogeneity in the
timing and magnitude of the eects. Moreover, the dispersion in quantities is accompanied
by broad cross-sectional variation in the response of investment prices. One interpretation
of this nding is that monetary nonneutralities are pervasive in markets for xed capital.
In addition to distributional eects, the data exposes certain patterns in the way market
conditions within more narrowly-dened asset classes react to a policy disturbance. Across
markets for durable equipment, output responses tend to be elastic while price responses
tend to be sluggish. Among producers of nonresidential structures, it is prices rather than
quantities that are frequently more responsive. Suppliers of residential structures see both
variables respond swiftly to a policy shock. These ndings along with others documented in
the paper contribute to recent eorts that shed light on the monetary transmission mech-
anism using information drawn from sectoral price and output data. That we nd strong
evidence of heterogeneity in the response functions speaks to the importance of understand-
ing the behavior of capital-goods prices and xed investment at the disaggregate level.
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Appendix
Table A
Components of private xed investment in 2007
Aggregation level
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Nonresidential 73.614
2. Structures 19.049
3. Commercial & health care 6.967
4. Oce1 2.371 2.371 2.371
5. Health care 1.535
6. Hospitals & special care 1.191
7. Hospitals 1.058
8. Special care 0.133
9. Medical buildings 0.344 0.344
10. Multimerchandise shopping 1.332 1.332 1.332
11. Food & beverage establishments 0.308 0.308 0.308
12. Warehouses 0.648 0.648 0.648
13. Other commercial2 0.773 0.773 0.773
14. Manufacturing 1.542 1.542 1.542 1.542
15. Power & communication 3.129
16. Power 2.075
17. Electric 1.590 1.590
18. Other power 0.485 0.485
19. Communication 1.054 1.054 1.054
20. Mining exploration, shafts, & wells 3.918
21. Petroleum & natural gas 3.636 3.636 3.636
22. Mining 0.282 0.282 0.282
23. Other structures 3.493
24. Religious 0.288 0.288 0.288
25. Educational & vocational 0.657 0.657 0.657
26. Lodging 1.304 1.304 1.304
27. Amusement & recreation 0.469 0.469 0.469
28. Transportation 0.345
29. Air 0.038 0.038
30. Land3 0.307 0.307
31. Farm 0.241 0.241 0.241
32. Other4 0.170 0.170 0.170
33. Brokers' commissions on sale of structures 0.130 0.130 0.130
34. Net purchases of used structures  0:112  0:112  0:112
35. Equipment 33.948
36. Information processing equipment 11.623
37. Computers and peripheral equipment 3.362 3.362 3.362
38. Communication equipment 4.069 4.069 4.069
39. Medical equipment & instruments 2.772
40. Electro-medical equipment 1.396 1.396
41. Medical instruments 1.376 1.376
42. Nonmedical instruments 0.999 0.999 0.999
43. Photocopy & related equipment 0.251 0.251 0.251
44. Oce & accounting equipment 0.169 0.169 0.169
Notes: The table reports nominal spending on each component as a percentage share of total private xed investment (PFI) in
2007. Shares are listed for every level of aggregation in the underlying NIPA series. The highest aggregation level (1 ) has only
two components while the lowest (6 ) breaks PFI into 67 components. At each level, the disaggregate shares sum to 100.
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Table A
Continued
Aggregation level
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6
45. Industrial equipment 7.439
46. Fabricated metal products 0.758 0.758 0.758
47. Engines & turbines 0.437
48. Steam engines 0.295 0.295
49. Internal combustion engines 0.142 0.142
50. Metalworking machinery 1.091 1.091 1.091
51. Special industry machinery, n.e.c.6 1.346 1.346 1.346
52. General industrial & materials handling 2.554 2.554 2.554
53. Electric transmission & distribution apparatus 1.253 1.253 1.253
54. Transportation equipment 7.237
55. Trucks, buses, & truck trailers 3.709
56. Light trucks, including utility vehicles7 2.531 2.531
57. Other trucks, buses, & truck trailers7 1.178 1.178
58. Autos7 1.866 1.866 1.866
59. Aircraft 1.085 1.085 1.085
60. Ships & boats 0.229 0.229 0.229
61. Railroad equipment 0.349 0.349 0.349
62. Other equipment 8.116
63. Furniture & xtures 1.614
64. Household furniture 0.107 0.107
65. Other furniture 1.507 1.507
66. Agricultural machinery 0.888
67. Farm tractors 0.373 0.373
68. Other agricultural machinery 0.515 0.515
69. Construction machinery 1.380
70. Construction tractors 0.108 0.108
71. Other construction machinery 1.272 1.272
72. Mining & oileld machinery 0.693 0.693 0.693
73. Service industry machinery 1.015 1.015 1.015
74. Electrical equipment, n.e.c. 0.202
75. Household appliances 0.032 0.032
76. Miscellaneous electrical 0.170 0.170
77. Other 2.325 2.325 2.325
78. Less: Sale of equipment scrap, excluding autos 0.467 0.467 0.467 0.467
79. Intellectual property products 20.617
80. Software8 9.359 9.359 9.359 9.359
81. Research & development9 8.560 8.560 8.560 8.560
82. Entertainment, literary, & artistic originals 2.698 2.698 2.698 2.698
83. Residential 26.386
84. Structures 26.007
85. Permanent site 13.567
86. Single-family structures 11.691 11.691 11.691
87. Multifamily structures 1.876 1.876 1.876
88. Other structures 12.440
89. Manufactured homes 0.360 0.360 0.360
90. Dormitories 0.111 0.111 0.111
91. Improvements 6.577 6.577 6.577
92. Brokers' commissions & other transfer costs10 5.544 5.544 5.544
93. Net purchases of used structures  0:153  0:153  0:153
94. Equipment 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.379
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Legend/Footnotes
1. Consists of oce buildings, except those constructed at manufacturing sites and those
constructed by power utilities for their own use. Includes all nancial buildings.
2. Includes buildings and structures used by the retail, wholesale and selected service
industries. Consists of auto dealerships, garages, service stations, drug stores, restau-
rants, mobile structures, and other structures used for commercial purposes. Bus or
truck garages are included in transportation.
3. Consists primarily of railroads.
4. Includes water supply, sewage and waste disposal, public safety, highway and street,
and conservation and development.
5. Consists of brokers' commissions on the sale of residential structures and adjoining
land, title insurance, state and local documentary stamp taxes, attorney fees, title
abstract and escrow fees, and fees for surveys and engineering services.
6. n.e.c. Not elsewhere classied.
7. Includes net purchases of used vehicles
8. Excludes software \embedded," or bundled, in computers and other equipment.
9. Research and development investment excludes expenditures for software development.
Software development expenditures are included in software investment on line 80.
10. Consists of brokers' commissions on the sale of residential structures and adjoining
land, title insurance, state and local documentary stamp taxes, attorney fees, title
abstract and escrow fees, and fees for surveys and engineering services.
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